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Germany has a well established broad statutory sur-
veillance system for infectious diseases. In the con-
text of the current outbreak of bloody diarrhoea and 
haemolytic uraemic syndrome caused by Shiga toxin/
verotoxin-producing Escherichia coli in Germany it 
became clear that the provisions of the routine sur-
veillance system were not sufficient for an adequate 
response. This article describes the timeline and con-
cepts of the enhanced surveillance implemented dur-
ing this public health emergency.
On Thursday, 19 May 2011, the Robert Koch Institute 
(RKI) was informed about a cluster of cases of haemo-
lytic uremic syndrome (HUS) due to Shiga toxin/vero-
toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC/VTEC) O104:H4 
in the area of Hamburg, Germany. An RKI investiga-
tion team visited the affected area the following day. 
In the face of rapidly rising case numbers, a need 
for enhanced surveillance was identified on 23 May. 
We describe here the timeline and concepts of the 
enhanced surveillance implemented during this mas-
sive outbreak of bloody diarrhoea and HUS in May and 
June 2011 in Germany.
Routine surveillance system
In Germany, STEC/VTEC and HUS have been statuto-
rily notifiable since 2001 according to the Protection 
against Infection Act (Infektionsschutzgesetz, IfSG [1]). 
While STEC/VTEC surveillance is based on laboratory 
analyses, HUS surveillance relies on physicians. Heads 
of laboratories and physicians must report cases to the 
local health authorities within 24 hours. The incom-
ing data is validated by the local health authorities 
and documented electronically. Cases fulfilling the 
surveillance case definition as issued by RKI [2] are 
transmitted in anonymous form to the state health 
authorities by the third working day of the follow-
ing week. The state health authorities again validate 
incoming cases and transmit the data to the RKI within 
the following week. Hence, transferring information on 
a case from the local to the national health authority 
may take from a few days up to 16 days.
Epidemiological information is fed back from RKI at 
least weekly to the stakeholders, e.g. responsible 
authorities, physicians and laboratories. Information 
exchange includes teleconferences, reports in the 
RKI’s weekly Epidemiological Bulletin and the internet 
database SurvStat [3].
Enhanced surveillance system
In the context of the outbreak it became immedi-
ately clear that the provisions of the routine surveil-
lance system were not sufficient for an adequate 
response. Hence, the following amendments were 
implemented:
•	 Centralising the epidemiological information 
exchange,
•	 Accelerating the data flow to the national level,
•	 Implementing a syndromic surveillance system for 
bloody diarrhoea in emergency departments,
•	 Assessing the capacities for HUS-treatment in 
Germany,
•	 Initiating active laboratory surveillance.
An overview of routine and newly implemented surveil-
lance systems is given in Figure 1.
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Centralising the epidemiological 
information exchange
On 23 May 2011, the ‘Lagezentrum’ at the RKI was acti-
vated as a central emergency operations centre. A large 
number of RKI staff was involved in coordinating the 
collection of epidemiologic information and organis-
ing the public health response. From 23 May onwards, 
teleconferences were conducted almost daily with the 
responsible state, national and international authori-
ties. Starting on 24 May, epidemiological reports were 
distributed daily to the responsible authorities, physi-
cians and laboratories to feed back relevant informa-
tion. Several outbreak-related articles were published in 
Eurosurveillance [4,5] and the German Epidemiological 
Bulletin. The public was regularly informed about the 
outbreak situation via the RKI website starting on 23 
May, press releases were issued on 3 and 10 June. The 
Federal Centre for Health Education (Bundeszentrale 
für Gesundheitliche Aufklärung, BZGA), has provided 
outbreak-related public health advice to the public 
since 24 May.
Accelerating the data flow to the national level
From 23 to 27 May 2011, state health authorities were 
asked to transmit aggregated data via email on a daily 
basis to the RKI. Concurrently, health authorities were 
urged to enter and transmit the IfSG data via the elec-
tronic surveillance system daily, so that case by case 
reporting could overtake the aggregated reporting 
on 27 May. A specific reporting form was published 
on 26 May to facilitate notification of HUS cases by 
physicians.
In addition, the existing RKI surveillance case defini-
tion was adapted to the outbreak situation to ensure 
systematic data collection. Modifications included 
Figure 1
Data and information flow to and from the Robert Koch Institute during the period of enhanced surveillance, STEC/HUS 
outbreak, Germany, spring 2011 
ECDC: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; HUS: haemolytic uraemic syndrome; IfSG: German Protection against Infection Act; 
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limitations of time (onset of disease from 1 May 2011), 
place (epidemiological link to Germany) and person 
(e.g. consumption of a food item that was acquired in 
Germany) concerning exposure as well as inclusion of 
suspected cases [6].
One challenge was counting outbreak-related cases of 
STEC/VTEC O104:H4 separately from other STEC/VTEC 
cases, of which a mean of 992 cases annually had been 
reported to the RKI between 2001 and 2010. In the 
absence of comprehensive laboratory data for a major-
ity of reported cases, the case definition was revised in 
a way that listed as exclusion criteria all specific labo-
ratory test results that were not consistent with the 
characteristics of the outbreak strain.
As of June 12, a total of 3,228 STEC/VTEC and HUS cases 
in Germany have been associated with the outbreak 
(Figure 2). The majority of cases (51%) fell ill between 
18 and 25 May. The place of exposure was suspected 
to lie in north-western parts of Germany for most cases 
(Figure 3). Of the 781 reported HUS cases, 69% were 
female and 88% were 20 years of age or older. Overall, 
22 notified HUS ca¬ses have died. Among all 2,447 
STEC/VTEC cases, 59% were female and 87% were 
20 years of age or older. Thirteen notified STEC/VTEC 
cases have died.
Figure 4 shows the transmission delay in days from 
the local to the national level during the STEC/HUS 
outbreak period among HUS cases. Among the 740 
HUS cases (96%) with known date of notification to 
the local health authorities, the median transmission 
delay was two days (25th–75th percentile: 1–4 days, 
minimum–maximum: 0–18 days). The first HUS-case 
was reported to the RKI through the electronic sur-
veillance system on 18 May. Another three HUS cases 
were reported on 23 May. Thereafter, the accelerated 
data flow became evident, for instance, 47 HUS cases 
were reported to the RKI on 24 May, 50 HUS cases on 
25 May, 100 HUS cases on 26 May and 116 HUS cases 
on 27 May. 
Implementing a syndromic surveillance system 
for bloody diarrhoea in emergency departments
Since STEC patients often present with bloody diar-
rhoea, emergency departments (ED) constitute appro-
priate facilities for the assessment of the temporal 
trend of an STEC-outbreak. We implemented the sur-
veillance of patients with and without bloody diarrhoea 
in ED on 27 May.
Participating ED were located in all federal states of 
Germany, both in areas affected and not affected by 
the STEC/HUS outbreak (see Figure 4). Data collection 
covered the total number of new patients in partici-
pating ED and the number of patients presenting with 
bloody diarrhoea by sex and age group (<20 years, ≥20 
years). The data were transferred to the RKI by email or 
fax every day.
Figure 2
Reported STEC/VTEC and HUS cases, by date of onset of 
diarrhoeaa, Germany, May–June 2011 (n=2,694)
ED: Emergency department; HUS: haemolytic uraemic syndrome; 
STEC: Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli.

























Cumulative incidence of HUS cases per suspected 
county of exposure and emergency departments actively 
participating in the syndromic surveillance system, 
Germany, May–June 2011
ED: Emergency department; HUS: haemolytic uraemic syndrome; 
STEC: Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli.
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As of 12 June, a total of 174 ED have participated in 
the syndromic surveillance system; 27 of which were 
located within affected areas. The number of ED 
actively reporting varied from day to day. Thus results 
may change as further, re¬tro¬spective, reports are 
received from ED. Between 28 May and 12 June, 4.7% 
(744/15,884) of all patients presenting to ED in affected 
regions were reported as having bloody diarrhoea 
(Figure 5); this proportion was 0.8% (464/55,255) in 
non-affected regions. Figure 5 shows the sex and age 
distribution of patients with BD as well as the number 
of participating ED in affected areas. Women were 
affected more often than men, with a decreasing pro-
portion of female cases observed after 30 May. Since 
6 June, the proportion of all patients with bloody diar-
rhoea among the patients presenting to emergency 
departments has remained on an average of 3.6%.
Assessing the capacities for treatment of 
haemolytic uraemic syndrome in Germany
From 30 May onwards, the German Society for 
Nephrology collected data on the HUS treatment 
capacities in Germany and reported these regularly via 
e mail to the RKI. During the outbreak period, 79 hos-
pitals, located in 15 of the 16 federal states, provided 
almost daily information: all but two confirmed having 
sufficient capacities for treating HUS patients.
Initiating active laboratory surveillance 
Since 25 May, the RKI has asked four laboratories for 
daily data transfer per email or telephone. As of 12 
June, a total of 195 (6%) of all 3,228 STEC/HUS cases 
have been confirmed through the routine mandatory 
system as caused by the outbreak strain STEC/VTEC 
O104, whereas the active system provided evidence 
that at least 335 patient samples were related to the 
outbreak strain.
Reports to the European Union and 
the World Health Organization
Following international law, Germany informed the 
European Union (EU) of the STEC/HUS outbreak via 
Figure 4
Date of notification of HUS cases to local health authority 
in relation to date of reception at Robert Koch Institute, 
Germany, May–June 2011
HUS: haemolytic uraemic syndrome; PH: public holiday; STEC: 
Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli; WE: weekend.
Weekends and public holidays in bold; the x- and y-axis 
additionally show the number of reports received.
The size of the circle is equivalent to the number of cases 
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Figure 5
Proportions of patients with bloody diarrhoea among all patients presenting to emergency departments, by age and sex, in 
areas affected by the STEC/HUS outbreak, Germany, May–June 2011 (n=744)
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the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) on 22 
May 2011, and notified the event as a potential public 
health emergency of international concern within the 
framework of the International Health Regulations (IHR) 
2005 on 24 May. The RKI sent updates on the situation 
to EWRS, the Epidemic Intelligence Information System 
(EPIS) and the World Health Organization (WHO) on a 
daily basis.
Both the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) and the WHO immediately supported 
the outbreak investigations by staying in close con-
tact with Germany and other countries and reporting 
imported STEC/HUS cases (in travellers) associated 
with the outbreak.
Conclusions
Germany has a well established broad statutory sur-
veillance system for infectious diseases. However, 
the rather long time limits permitted for communi-
cating information on cases from the local to the 
state/national level led to delayed recognition of this 
outbreak: The first report at the national level was 
received on 18 May 2011, while the first outbreak-asso-
ciated cases fell ill on 1 May, with a sharp increase in 
case numbers on 9 May. This is a limitation requiring 
further evaluation. In this specific outbreak situation, 
the mandatory surveillance system required enhance-
ment that was rapidly and effectively implemented. 
Physicians, laboratories, local and state health author-
ities supported the acceleration and extension of the 
system extraordinarily well. Feedback to the public, 
the responsible authorities, physicians and laborato-
ries was ensured daily, e.g. by updates on websites, 
teleconferences and reports.
The additional surveillance instruments were voluntary 
and allowed for more timely monitoring of this public 
health emergency. Laboratory surveillance permit-
ted assessment of the actual number of laboratory-
confirmed outbreak cases particularly in the early 
stages. Monitoring capacity for treating HUS patients 
in German hospitals allowed us to evaluate whether 
or not international help would be needed. Syndromic 
surveillance in ED permitted us to follow the tempo-
ral trend of bloody diarrhoea patients as a proxy for 
potentially new STEC/VTEC cases.
We conclude that infectious disease surveillance in 
Germany can rapidly be adapted to specific outbreak 
situations. Nevertheless, data flow within the statutory 
surveillance system should be accelerated, e.g. by use 
of an electronic notification system by physicians and 
laboratories, and a common central data base. We rec-
ommend continuing syndromic surveillance in ED for at 
least the next three months to ensure timely detection 
of possible new trends.
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